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The Place of JUSTICE in The Synthetic
Philosophy
JUSTICE,
to which we are to look for Mr. Spencer's present opinions on the land question,
is esteemed by its author his most important book. This volume, the full
title of which is, The Ethics of Social Life—Justice, is also entitled
Part IV of Ethics. It is the tenth of the ponderous volumes
already published, which are advertised as "Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy."
The grand divisions of this Synthetic Philosophy, as now advertised, are:
First Principles, The Principles of Biology, The Principles
of Psychology, Principles of Sociology, and Principles of Morality.
Of these five grand divisions, the Principles of Morality, as it
is styled in the advertisements, or Principles of Ethics, as it is
styled in the title-page of the book itself, is the grand division to which
Justice belongs in the Spencerian scheme. The first volume
of this grand division, The Data of Ethics, has been
already published. Volume II, The Inductions of Ethics, and Volume
III, The Ethics of Individual Life, have not yet appeared,* Mr. Spencer,
as he states in the preface to Justice, preferring to hasten this
volume, as most important. After these two deferred volumes have been completed,
there are, as he also tells us, two more volumes, The Ethics
of Social Life—Negative Benevolence, and The Ethics
of Social Life—Positive Benevolence, to which he will turn his attention,
thus completing his full philosophical scheme.
*They have been published since this
was put in plate.
This scheme of "Synthetic Philosophy" is the
most pretentious that ever mortal man undertook, since it embraces no less
than an explanation to mankind, without recourse to the hypothesis of Originating
Intelligence, of how the world and all that is in it contained, including
we ourselves, our motives, feelings, powers, instincts, habits and customs,
came to be. Of this large scheme, the ethical part is the most important,
being, as Mr. Spencer tells us, "that to which I regard all the preceding
parts as subsidiary." And of this most important part, he also tells us
that this volume, The Ethics of Social Life—Justice, is the most
important.
Thus Justice, which so far as it treats
of the land question we are about to consider, is by its author deemed the
very summit and capstone of his whole philosophy.
And that, indeed, it must be, follows from
the supreme importance of its subject matter. For it treats of right and
wrong, of what should and what should not be, in those social relations
of men from which spring the most fiercely debated practical questions of
our time-questions that involve the happiness or misery, the physical, mental
and moral development of vast populations, the advance of civilization or
its retrogression. As to the principles of right and wrong in individual
relations there is little if any dispute; and not merely through Christendom,
but "from Paris to Pekin" mankind are substantially agreed as to what constitutes
good or bad. It is when we come to the social relations of men—to those social
adjustments which prescribe and control rights of ownership, which affect
the production, distribution, accumulation and enjoyment of wealth, which
are the main ground of legislation, and which over and above the injunctions
of individual morality throw around men a perfect network of shalls and
shall nots, that we reach the befogged and debatable land—the region of
burning questions.
It is where the philosopher thus passes from
the region of mere curious speculation into the arena where, for men living
and men yet to come, the issues of want or plenty, of ignorance or enlightenment,
of slavery or freedom, must be decided, that the ordinary apprehension
may best apply to his teachings the tests of usefulness and sincerity.
That the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and that the tree is best
known by its fruit, are maxims not to be disregarded in philosophy. What
matters the teaching of any philosophy as to the origin of things, compared
with its teaching on matters that affect the fullness, happiness and nobleness
of life? And how shall we tell whether the philosopher be an earnest man
or a mere prater, so readily and so clearly as by noting whether he takes
the side of wronger or of wronged, the undeservedly rich or the undeservedly
poor? Thus, Justice is not merely the roof and crown of the Spencerian
Synthetic Philosophy; it is its touchstone as well.
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